Manchester United stadium economics: stadium economic impact claims: a 100,000-seat stadium: build one less seat than you can sell

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£2bn. 100,000 seats. Three questions first — stadium economic impact claims: Manchester United stadium economics

Manchester United stadium economics. Stadium economic impact claims. Manchester United’s proposed stadium is a £2bn, 100,000-seat ground by Foster + Partners, with a target opening of 2030-31. The club and the regeneration case cite £7.3bn a year for the economy and 92,000 jobs. Those are the promoters’ projections. Here is what to test before believing them. Reference data is published by the OECD.

The proposal

Manchester United has proposed a 100,000-seat stadium on the Old Trafford site, designed by Foster + Partners, at a reported cost of £2bn, with a target opening for the 2030-31 season. It would be the largest football ground in Britain and the second largest in Europe. The wider regeneration case, covering a one-million-square-metre brownfield site, cites 17,000 new homes, 92,000 jobs, and £7.3bn a year for the economy.

Those last three figures are the promoters’ projections, produced for the case. They may be right. They have not been tested by anyone who did not want the answer to be yes.

One fewer seat

Living Lab’s advice to every stadium client is the same. Build one less seat than you can sell. A dead seat costs money to clean, maintain, and replace whether anyone sits in it or not, and it sends ticket prices down for every seat around it.

Manchester United has a vast global fanbase, and most of it is a long way away. There will never be more than a few thousand international travelling fans at any match. The in-stadium product is for the people who can get there on a Saturday, and the capacity should be sized to them.

Build one less seat than you can sell. Dead seats send ticket prices down and cost a fortune to maintain.

Anfield precedent

Liverpool expanded Anfield from about 45,000 to over 61,000 seats. Most of the additional seats went to members rather than to new season-ticket holders, which prioritised yield and left long-standing supporters on waiting lists. It is a legitimate commercial choice, and it changed the relationship between the club and its own supporters. A 100,000-seat ground makes the same choice at a larger scale, and the ticketing strategy deserves the same scrutiny as the architecture.

Test the £7.3bn

An annual economic contribution of that size is a footprint claim, and a footprint claim has to state what it includes, over what geography, and how much of it would have happened anyway. The homes and the jobs come with the regeneration, not the stadium; the stadium is the reason the regeneration is being proposed now. Separating the two is the first task.

The second is displacement. Matchday spend in Trafford that moved from elsewhere in Greater Manchester is not new to the region. The third is the dark nights: a 100,000-seat ground is used perhaps 30 times a year, and the district has to work on the other 335.

Projections, not proof

The proposal could be the best stadium in the world, and the regeneration could matter more than London 2012 did. Both are possible, and both are claims. The mayor is seeking over £200m of public money for the regeneration, and that is the point at which projections become a public-value case that has to survive scrutiny.

The method is on the pages for venues and operators and public value, GVA, and fiscal return.

For further reading, see Greater Manchester regeneration case.

Actionable takeaways

Ask three things of the £7.3bn: what geography, what counterfactual, and how much is the stadium rather than the homes around it. The answers decide whether £200m of public money is an investment or a subsidy.

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